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Abstract
This article introduces and applies two reﬁnements to the algorithm of solv-
ing rational expectations models of a currency union. Firstly, building upon
Klein (2000), it generalizes the standard methods of solving rational expecta-
tions models to the case of time-varying nonstochastic parameters, recurring in
a ﬁnite cycle. Such a speciﬁcation occurs in a simple stylized New Keynesian
model of the euro area after a joint introduction of (i) rotation in the ECB
Governing Council (as constituted by the Treaty of Nice) and (ii) home bias
in the interest rate decisions preferred by its members. Secondly, we apply the
method of Christiano (2002) to solve the model with heterogenous information
sets. This is justiﬁed if we argue that the information set of domestic economic
agents in a currency union is home-biased (i.e. foreign shocks enter only with
a lag). Both methods of solution are illustrated with simulation results.
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1 Introduction
The launch of the euro area project has opened space for empirical research and pol-
icy discussions on asymmetric shocks and adjustment mechanisms in their aftermath.
Achieving a high capacity to absorb such shocks in the absence of autonomous mon-
etary and exchange rate policy has become one of key economic policy targets, both
for member and candidate countries. Market-based adjustment rests mainly upon the
competitiveness channel (see European Commission 2006 and 2008). The adjustment
process, however, may be hampered by the procyclical real interest rate mechanism,
„Walters critique”; see Walters (1994).
Cyclical divergence and structural heterogeneity of the euro area countries were in-
troduced into macroeconomic models in various ways. The main purpose of these
extensions was to answer the question about the optimum monetary policy conduct
in a monetary union. Following the works of Benigno (2004) and Benigno and Salido
(2006), a number of authors investigated the welfare consequences of cross-country
heterogeneity in intrinsic inﬂation persistence and market rigidities. Brissimis and
Skotida (2008) consider regional diﬀerences in intertemporal elasticity of substitu-
tion, Lombardo (2006) - in price elasticity of imports, while Blessing (2008) assesses
the welfare impact of structural heterogeneity in the presence of a nontradable sec-
tor. Further research includes diﬀerences in product and labour market ﬂexibility
(HM Treasury 2003, Rumler 2007), monetary transmission mechanisms; see Clausen
and Hayo (2006) or business cycle synchronization.
Relatively less attention has been paid to the role of expectations in business cycle
frictions of euro area member states, included in various dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium models. The most widespread New Keynesian framework with nominal
rigidities rests heavily upon forward-looking behaviour of economic agents. Conse-
quently, rational expectations setup is normally applied for a fully speciﬁed system.
Such system are solved using standard algorithms in the spirit of the seminal paper
by Blanchard and Kahn (1980) and then used in simulation analyses.
Expecations play a key role in the functioning of both adjustment mechanisms in
question. When a high inﬂation rate in an overheated economy translates into higher
inﬂation expectations, then an asymmetric cyclical position - given weak (or no) re-
action from the common central bank - results in a low real interest rate. This should
additionally fuel economic activity, boost the cyclical amplitude and prolongue the
period of adjustment. Nevertheless, if rational agents foresee that a protracted boom
will undermine their country’s external competitiveness, they anticipate the impact
of deteriorated competitive position. Consequently, they should reduce their expec-
tations of future output gap and inﬂation rate, which weakens the real interest rate
mechanism.
This article aims to contribute to the existing literature on euro area modelling by
including new features in the algorithm of solving out rational expectations. We
argue that, under certain assumptions regarding monetary policy framework in the
euro area and given the empirical evidence on expectations in the euro area from the
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literature, the application of classical solution methods, as in Blanchard and Kahn
(1980), can be insuﬃcient.
Firstly, this is because the rotation scheme in the ECB Governing Council (hence-
forth: the Council), as constituted by the Treaty of Nice, may imply time-varying
parameters in the Taylor rule approximating the ECB decisions. At present, the
Council is composed of all the national central bank governors from the euro area
countries with the right of vote in every decision meeting, as well as the ECB Board
of Directors (henceforth: the Board). In this institutional setup, further euro area
enlargement would imply a growing number of the Council members. This could
lower the eﬀectiveness of the decision process due to coordination problems, see e.g.
Gerlach-Kristen (2005) and eventually motivated the introduction of a rotation sys-
tem after the number of euro area members would exceed 15. This is the case since
January 1st, 2009 when Slovakia adopted the euro. The system, however, was not yet
implemented, as the reform can be postponed until there are 18 euro area member
states. Under the Treaty, part of the governors would be rotationally excluded from
the voting. A time-varying model is adequate when the rotation is coupled with some
home bias of the Council members in preferred interest rate decisions.
Secondly, the inclination of economic agents to form inﬂation expectations ﬁrst and
above all on the basis of the events in the domestic economy justiﬁes imposing het-
erogenous information sets across countries and hence across model equations. The
simulation results presented in the paper suggest that both aspects can impact the
volatility of inﬂation and output in the monetary union countries.
In contrast, the standard solution algorithm assumes both constant parameters and
homogenous information sets for all equations. We address these issues individually
by (i) generalizing the algorithm of Klein (2000) to the case of time-varying, non-
stochastic parameters, (ii) directly applying the algorithm of Christiano (2002) to
account for heterogeneity in information sets.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops a simple New Key-
nesian model of a monetary union and develops the extensions that challenge the
standard solution procedure. Section 3 reviews the literature on solving rational ex-
pectations models and proposes a method of solving a model with variable coeﬃcients
is proposed. Section 4 presents an application of the considered methods in simula-
tions. Section 5 concludes.
2 New Keynesian model of monetary policy and
cross-country adjustment in the euro area
This Section presents the basic New Keynesian model, capturing the main features
of monetary policy and competitiveness-based adjustment within a monetary union.
Its main purpose is to motivate the modiﬁcations to the solution algorithm from an
economic perspective.
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2.1 The baseline setup
The model considered in this paper draws heavily on the workhorse 3-equation New
Keynesian model for monetary policy analyses. It is composed of output gap equations
(IS curves), inﬂation equations (Phillips curves) and nominal interest rate equation
(central bank rule). The model has been extended to capture speciﬁc features of a
group of open economies, forming a monetary union, with the competitiveness channel
and the real interest rate eﬀect.
The union-wide monetary policy is described by a Taylor (1993) rule with smoothing,
see e.g. Sauer and Sturm (2003), for an extensive survey on Taylor rule applications
as approximations to the ECB monetary policy:
it = (1 − ρ)[r∗ + π∗ + γπ (πt − π∗) + γyyt] + ρit−1 (1)
with it - nominal central bank rate at time t, yt - output gap of the monetary union, πt
- inﬂation rate in the monetary union, r∗ - natural interest rate, π∗ - inﬂation target
of the common central bank, ρ ∈ (0;1) - smoothing parameter, γπ > 1, γy > 0 -
parameters for central bank reaction to deviation of inﬂation from the inﬂation target
and an open output gap respectively. The condition γπ > 1 is required for the Taylor
principle to be satisﬁed and the equilibrium to be determinate; see Taylor (1993). The
inﬂation rate and output gap in the entire monetary union are calculated as weighted









Country weights (vector wn×1) reﬂect relative sizes of n economies (j = 1,...,n) par-
ticipating in the monetary union. Technically, as the ECB deﬁnes the price stability
target in terms of the area-wide Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices dynamics
(„close to, but below 2%”), the weights could be associated with country weights for
the area-wide HICP formula, published by the Eurostat. These are derived from
national accounts as the share of consumption spendings of households in a given
country in the analogous value for the euro area (see Compendium of HICP reference
documents by Eurostat). They evolve sluggishly and most of their volatility was trig-
gered by accessions to the euro area (Greece, Slovenia, Malta, Cyprus, Slovakia).
The inﬂation rate in country j (πj) evolves according to a hybrid Phillips curve; see
Galí and Gertler (1999) and Galí, Gertler, López-Salido (2001):




j,t - cost-push shock in country j, yj,t - output gap in j. This speciﬁcation
results from maximizing future discounted ﬂows of proﬁts by ﬁrms. Only part of the
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producers are allowed to reset their prices in a given period; see Calvo (1983). They
are split in two groups: those who reoptimize their price and those who perform a
backward-looking indexation; see Galí and Gertler (1999) for an explicit derivation).
Also, real marginal cost - the actual driving process for inﬂation - is here assumed to
be a linear function of the output gap, which requires i.a. the assumption of perfect
labour market ﬂexibility.
The path of the output gap is determined by the following IS curve, augmented
with open economy components; see Clarida, Galí, Gertler (2001) and Goodhart and
Hofmann (2005):
yj,t = βf,jEtyj,t+1 + βb,jyj,t−1 − βr,j
￿




−βc,j (pj,t − p−j,t) + βs,jy−j,t + εd
j,t
(5)
where y−j,t denotes the output gap outside j, pj,t – log-level of prices in j, p−j,t –



















The standard closed-economy speciﬁcation has therefore been complemented with the
real exchange rate divergence, pj,t − p−j,t, and external demand gap, y−j,t. There
is no nominal exchange rate dynamics between monetary union member countries,
so the log-diﬀerence in price levels between the home and foreign economies can be
interpreted as log-real exchange rate. This (or a very similar) speciﬁcation of the IS
curve has previously been considered i.a. by Kosior, Rozkrut, Toroj (2009), Torój
(2009) and Menguy (2009).
The standard closed-economy IS curve, resulting from the Euler equation for con-
sumption and market clearing conditions, is extended in correspondence with the
point made by Clarida, Galí, Gertler (2001): demand conditions in a small open
economy are determined by external demand conditions and the ratio of domestic
prices (expressed in foreign currency) to the world’s price level. Excess appreciation
undermines the price competitiveness of domestic goods abroad (βc > 0), and foreign
economic downturns translate into slowdowns at home (βs > 0). The rest of the pa-
rameters in (4) and (5), in line with the New Keynesian literature, should be positive.
The model composed of equations (1)-(8) can be written in the following matrix form:
AEtxt+1 = Bxt + Cft (9)











ft – vector of random disturbances, A, B, C – matrices of model parameters. The
detailed description of matrices construction is explicitly provided in Appendix 1.
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2.2 Extension 1: rotation scheme in the ECB Governing
Council
In the baseline version of the model, the monetary policy conduct of a union’s central
bank was described by means of a Taylor rule operating on the union’s aggregate
inﬂation and output (1). Accordingly, in the euro area, the mandate of the ECB Gov-
erning Council is to maintain price stability in the entire union; see European Central
Bank (2003). However, some opponents of the reform of voting modalities in the
ECB argue that the new system could create incentives to abandon the pro-european
perspective and renationalize the european monetary policy; see Belke (2003).
Namely, the new voting system in the ECB is claimed to additionally emphasize the
national structure of the Council. This is because it introduces rotation into the
Council, following similar solutions adopted e.g. in the USA. It was motivated by the
euro area enlargements and coordination problems accompanying a decision process
after the Council becomes of excess size; see Gerlach-Kristen (2005). Consequently,
the euro area countries are to be split into 2 groups (when 16 to 21 states share the
common currency) or 3 groups (for more than 21 states). With 2 groups, 5 greatest
member states would delegate 4 central bank governors to the Council (in a rotating
manner) and the rest of the member states - 11 representatives. With 3 groups, 5
biggest member states would delegate 4 governors, half of the states (rounded up for
an odd number) - 8 governors and the rest - 3 governors; see Kosior, Rozkrut, Toroj
(2009) for more technical details.
Consequences of the reform have been analyzed in the literature from diﬀerent view-
points and with various tools (see Table 1). On the normative level, the assessments
of the new voting system vary. However, most of the authors arrive at the conclu-
sion that a pro-european orientation of policymakers (i.e. zero home bias in interest
rate decisions) maximizes the union’s welfare after the reform. This contribution fol-
lows Kosior, Rozkrut, Torój (2009) in using the same macroeconomic framework, but
extends that analysis by combining the rotation, home bias and a forward-looking
perspective in a single model. Assume that every central bank governor implicitly
prefers some nominal interest rate level, conditional upon the (possibly asymmetric)
cyclical position of their country of origin:
ij,t = (1 − ρ)
￿








The literature diﬀerentiates between a cyclical and a structural (long-term) stress.
If policymakers wanted to reduce the cyclical stress in their country of origin, see
Calmfors (2007), Flaig and Wollmershäuser (2007), they would be inclined to vote in
favour of interest rate changes towards ij,t, even if these changes were at odds with
(1). Calmfors (2007) and Flaig and Wollmershäuser (2007) also ﬁnd some evidence
that many euro area countries have suﬀered from the structural art of stress in the
period 1999-2006. Nonetheless, the inclusion of structural stress into the governors’
preferences would result in a „wandering” steady state of the model. In consequence, it
is not impossible to analyze the second-moment properties of variables with the tools
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Table 1: Voting reform in the ECB Governing Council: review of the literature





Standard New Keynesian framework.
Cross-country heterogeneity stems
from diﬀerent monetary policy
preferences, transmission
mechanisms and business cycle
developments.
The Board of Directors can eﬀectively lead the
monetary policy even when governors of
individual central banks are home biased.





Regional bias combined with
rotation system. No endogeneity of
future output or inﬂation with
respect to interest rates.
Introduction of rotation will impact the
eﬀectiveness of ECB policy to a limited extent.
Low rotation frequency would be beneﬁcial to
the „old” member states.
Paczyński
(2006)
Regional bias combined with
rotation system. Various degrees of
home bias and decision rules
considered.
Substantial home bias of the Council members




Voting power indices and the
regional bias of the Board’s
members.
The rotation system strengthens the ECB
Board of Directors and - marginally - the big
euro area economies. Sudden shifts in voting





The rotation system strengthens the ECB





Voting power indices. New
Keynesian model.
Pro-european focus of the Council’s members
minimizes output and inﬂation volatility.
Source: Kosior, Rozkrut, Torój (2009); author
applied in this paper, but this extension would make the results dependent on the
estimates of long-term inﬂation diﬀerentials (Harrod-Balassa-Samuelson eﬀect) and
natural rates of interest. This is why we leave the structural aspect of the stress for
future research. The ﬁnal preference of the national central bank governor, declared
in the voting, is deﬁned as a weighted average of the „pro-european” rate in (1) and
the preferred rate for his country of origin, as in (10):
˜ ij,t = (1 − α)it + αij,t (11)
The parameter α ∈ [0;1] measures the home bias in the decision of the Council’s
members. In this paper, we assume equal α across all Council members. With fully
„pro-european” voters, α = 0. The other limiting case of fully home-biased voters
occurs when α = 1.
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The outcome of voting at t is approximated by the arithmetic average over preferences
submitted by the governors allowed to vote at t. After the reform, only 15 (of a higher
number of) national central bank governors would vote at a single meeting. Let aj,t
be a dummy equal 1 when country j representative has got the right to vote at t and








aj,t · ((1 − α)it + αij,t) (12)
Also, this can easily be extended to incorporate a possible home bias of 6 Board’s
members. Assume that aj,t = 1 if country j is at t represented either among the
voting governors or in the Board (but not both), aj,t = 2 if it is represented in both
groups and aj,t = 0 else. In this case,
P
j aj,t = 21. After some basic modiﬁcations,
this setup allows us to set diﬀerent degrees of home bias e.g. for the Board and the
governors in the Council. In our numerical example, however, we do not consider this
option.
Substituting (1)-(3) and (10) into (12), we obtain the ﬁnal form of the Taylor rule for
the ECB:
¯ it = (1 − ρ){r∗ + π∗ +
￿
(1 − α)wT + αaT
t
￿
γπ (πt − π∗)+
+
￿





where symbols in bold subscripted t are vectors of size n×1 containing a sequence of
identically denoted variables over countries, and π∗ = π∗ · 1n×1.
Note that if the home bias of the central bank governors is non-zero, the rotation
scheme implies that the Taylor rule parameters for inﬂation rates and output gaps in
individual economies vary in time. In other words, country weights in the nominal
interest rate equation, as opposed to equations (2)-(3), are non-constant. In conse-
quence, so is the matrix B in (9).
Non-constant parameters of the model (9) prevent us from applying standard solution
methods.
2.3 Extension 2: country-speciﬁc information sets
Not only can the members of the Council exhibit home bias in their policy decisions.
It can also be justiﬁed in the case of producers’ and consumers’ expectations. There
is some empirical evidence in the literature in favour of such a bias.
The estimates of Taylor rule parameters for countries that formed the euro area in
1999 suggest that individual central banks conducted monetary policy in signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent manners before they ﬁnally passed this responsibility to the ECB; see Eleft-
heriou, Gerdesmeier, Roﬃa (2006). Berger, Ehrmann, Fratzscher (2006) ﬁnd econo-
metric evidence that expectations of future ECB decisions substantially varied in the
geograﬁc dimension in the ﬁrst years of the euro area. Woodford (2006) argues that
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the process of learning the new monetary policy regime among economic agents and
hence altering their expectation formation habits might be protracted. The regime
change clearly increased the degree of economic integration which not necessarily is
accounted for in economic agents’ information sets.
In a monetary union, agents could expect the foreign macroeconomic shocks to hit
their domestic economy via a few channels. Firstly, the common central bank would
react to foreign demand shocks with a move in the common policy rate, which would
in turn translate directly into a change in domestic monetary conditions. Secondly,
a foreign shock aﬀects future price dynamics abroad. As a result, the real exchange
rate would change – even when there were no direct price eﬀects at home – which is
another way to inﬂuence the domestic monetary conditions. Thirdly, foreign business
cycle aﬀects the domestic output due to international trade and investment links.
Economic agents are therefore capable to predict an economic slowdown at home
when they observe one in other countries.
Outside a monetary union, agents would have less incentive to monitor the foreign
events. Firstly, the reaction of foreign central banks to foreign shocks does not auto-
matically aﬀect the nominal interest rates at home, which remain under the command
of the domestic central bank. Secondly, a shock aﬀecting foreign price dynamics does
not necessarily translate into a shift in competitive position of domestic versus foreign
producers, as measured with the real exchange rate. More precisely, this rate is also
dependent on the nominal exchange rate, which can absorb asymmetric shocks; see
Stążka (2009). Because of these two channels, Marzinotto (2008) argues e.g. that
mid-size economies are largely at risk of excessive wage growth. Namely, their trade
unions are too small to inﬂuence the ECB decisions in a signiﬁcant way and too
large to fear the loss of external competitiveness. Thirdly, the ample literature on
the endogeneity of OCA criteria; e.g. integration of ﬁnance and trade in a common
currency area, see e.g. Frankel and Rose (1998), or European Commission (2008)
suggests growing interdependence of individual countries’ output gaps after creating
a monetary union.
For the reasons listed above, domestic agents - especially at the initial stages of par-
ticipation in a monetary union - can be accustomed to form their expectations mainly
on the basis of domestic events and to a lesser extent on the basis of foreign shocks.
This would break the underlying assumptions of the standard expectations opera-
tor applied in the model (9), based on a common information set of agents in each
country. As a consequence, this aspect of heterogeneity must be analyzed beyond the
standard model solution methods.
More formally, in the baseline model, expectations of future output and inﬂation are
formed in a rational manner, with all the information available at t being taken into
account:
E (yj,t) = E (yj,t|Ωt)
E (πj,t) = E (πj,t|Ωt)
(14)
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with Ωt = [ft,ft−1,...] in equations (4)-(5). Should the information sets of agents
in individual countries, however, be home biased, then country-speciﬁc output and
inﬂation expectations would be deﬁned as:
E (yj,t) = E (yj,t|Ωj,t)
E (πj,t) = E (πj,t|Ωj,t)
(15)
whereby Ωj,t ⊆ Ωt for each j.
The redeﬁnition of the information sets does not aﬀect the structural parameters of
the forward-looking model (9). It aﬀects, however, the algorithm that leads to model
solution and hence changes the parameters of the solved model, impulse-response
functions to shocks and second moment properties of variables. In this paper, we
apply the method of Christiano (2002) designed to solve models with expectations
deﬁned as (15).
3 Solving linear rational expectations models
The solution of a dynamic linear model with rational expectations written as (9) is a
transformation of (9) into a recursive law of motion; see Blanchard and Kahn (1980),
Uhlig (1999), Klein (2000) and Sims (2001):
xt = Mxt−1 + Nft (16)
This transformation is usually performed to run counterfactual simulations, impulse-
response functions and second moment analysis; see DeJong and Dave (2007), Chris-
tiano (2002). Lindé (2005), Fuhrer and Rudebusch (2004) and other authors stress the
possibility to use the mapping to estimate the parameters of the solved model (16)
directly via full information maximum likelihood method. They show with Monte
Carlo simulation exercises that such estimation outperforms the GMM estimator,
traditionally applied in empirical investigations of the New Keynesian model.
Blanchard and Kahn (1980) solved the model (9) assuming nonsingularity of A and
performing the Jordan decomposition on A−1B. They also developed a milestone
theorem about the existence and uniqueness of a solution: the number of variables
predetermined at t included in xt must equal the number of eigenvalues of the matrix
A
−1B that do not exceed 1 in absolute value (saddle-path stability).
The assumption of a nonsingular matrix A is relaxed by Klein (2000) as he applies
generalized complex Schur decomposition to matrices A and B. A similar method is
proposed by Sims (2001) for the model (9) expressed in terms of true future values of
variables and expectation errors rather than the expectation operator. The solution
results from a unique linear mapping from ft to the expectation errors. Söderlind
(1999) applies a Klein-based algorithm and admits that generalized eigenvalues equal
1 in absolute terms can be classiﬁed as stable when the vector xt contains variables
that are explicitly nonstationary by construction (which also is the case in our model).
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Uhlig (1999) proposes a method of undetermined coeﬃcients, which reduces the prob-
lem to solving a matrix quadratic equation.
3.1 Standard solution
Without additional assumptions, developed in Subsections 2.2 and 2.3, we can apply
a standard algorithm for solving the model (9) for simulations. In this Subsection, we
present the method of Klein (2000), commonly applied in analyses based on dynamic
stochastic general equilibrium setup. For future reference, we also indicate the points
in the algorithm that will need to be changed when the assumption of parameter
constancy will be relaxed.
Klein (2000) applies to matrices A and B in (9) a complex generalized Schur decom-




whereby S and T – upper triangular matrices, Q and Z – unitary matrices (QQH =
QHQ = ZZH = ZHZ = I), where the superscript H denotes hermitian transpose
(S,T,Q and Z are complex matrices). Without loss of generality, suppose that xt
is partitioned into x1,t containing variables predetermined at t and x2,t containing
variables non-predetermined at t.
Klein (2000) deﬁnes the following substitution:
˜ xt = ZHxt (18)
























Upper-triangularity of S and T has decoupled the lower portion of the redeﬁned vector
˜ xt, which can be solved out of (19) as follows:
˜ x2,t = T
−1
22S22Et˜ x2,t+1 − T
−1
22Q2Cft (20)
Iterating (20) forward and using the law of iterated expectations, see Ljungqvist and
Sargent (2004), we express ˜ x2,t as the following inﬁnite sum:





















Note that the forward iteration of (20) to (21) exploits the assumption parameter
constancy.
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According to Proposition 1 by Blanchard and Kahn (1980), there exists a unique
solution if the number of explosive eigenvalues (i.e. lying outside the unit circle)
equals the number of non-predetermined variables. If this applied to the generalized
eigenvalues of A and B, all of the eigenvalues concentrated in the block (2,2) would
be explosive and hence the inﬁnite sum would exist and the limit would converge to
zero.
Another condition formulated by Blanchard and Kahn (1980) is that the exogenous
variables in ft do not „explode too fast” in expectations:
∀t ∃¯ ft ∈ R
k,θt ∈ R ∀i ≥ 0 − (1 + i)
θt¯ ft ≤ E (ft+i) ≤ (1 + i)
θt¯ ft (22)
In rational expectations models, autoregressive error terms are natural by construc-
tion and hence commonly applied, so let us assume a VAR representation; see e.g.
Mavroeidis (2005):
ft = Φft−1 + εt (23)
with Etεt+k = 0, k = 1,2,.... Stationarity of this process, i.e. nonexplosive eigen-
values of Φ, allow us to calculate (24). As Etft+k = Φ
kft given (23), we can rewrite
(24) as



























Following Klein (2000), we calculate the elements of L using the vectorization






FiGHi. Note that the only diﬀerence between this sum and L





vec(B) to get vec(L)−HT ⊗F·vec(L) = vec(G).
This can be premultiplied by
￿
I − HT ⊗ F
￿−1




I − HT ⊗ F
￿−1
vec(G) (25)
We use the solution for the unstable component, (24), in the upper portion of (19):
S11Et˜ x1,t+1 − S12T
−1
22LΦft = T11˜ x1,t − T12T
−1
22Lft + Q1Cft (26)
















This allows us to express ˜ x1,t in terms of x1,t:
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Equations (29) and (30) are the solution of the model (9).
3.2 Extension 1: model with time-varying parameters
The time-varing Taylor rule (13) requires solving a model like (9), but with time-
varying parameters:
A(t)Et (xt+1) = B(t)xt + C(t)ft (31)
The solutions of models with variable coeﬃcients proposed in the literature are usu-
ally designed for stochastic parameters (e.g. Markov switching with ﬁnite number of
states). Farmer, Waggoner, Zha (2008) apply a minimum state variable solution that
expands the vector xt times the number of possible states and adjust the parameter
matrices appropriately. The above system could also be treated as nonlinear in vari-
ables and solved numerically, given exogenous paths for at in (13). However, treating
coeﬃcients as nonstochastic corresponds better to the institutional setup (as long as
it is credible for economic agents) and ﬁnding an analytical soultion to the problem
seems to be more reliable and computationally eﬃcient.
The solution proposed below builds upon the algorithm by Klein (2000), while in-
troducing some necessary generalizations. In our model, it would suﬃce to allow for
only one time-varying matrix – either A or B, as with the assumptions from sec-
tion 2.2 we could place all time-varying parameters into a single matrix. However,
it does not really simplify further derivations as the generalized Schur decomposition
with imposed eigenvalue ordering is unique and all the output matrices would inherit
time-variability, no matter how many input matrices (1 or 2) would bear this feature.
Neither does time-dependent C(t) cause any signiﬁcant analytical or numerical com-
plication. This is why the system (31) and its solution is expressed in more general
terms that our example would require.
It is useless to start with a single generalized Schur decomposition because the fac-
tor matrices we would obtain inherit the nonconstancy and parameter matrices for
xt and Et (xt+1) would not be upper triangular as we need. A time-varying matrix
Z(t) (see (17)) does not allow us to deﬁne the substitution (18) in a unique way. If
we chose some arbitrary Z matrix in time (say, Z(t)), every equation would link two
diﬀerent variables, which would obviously leave no space to proceed. This problem
would indeed be solved by ﬁnding the generalized Schur decomposition for A(t) and
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B(t+1). However, in the latter case, there would be no Q(t) to premultiply any equa-
tion leaving both matrices in question upper triangular (see (17)).
Instead, we exploit the assumption that A(t) and B(t) vary in time, but the values
recur after m periods, i.e. A(t+j) = A(t+j+i·m) and B(t+j) = B(t+j+i·m) for each
j = 0,1,...,m − 1 and each i ∈ N. Let us ﬁrst factorize the matrices A(t) and B(t)





with S,T,Q and Z bearing the same properties as their counterparts in the standard
case (Subsection 3.1). For the decomposition to be unique, we impose a restriction
that diagonal elements of S and T are ordered in such a way that generalized eigen-
values of A and B (equal
Si,i
Ti,i) ascend with rising index i.





(t)xt + Q(t)C(t)ft (33)






















A bottom-up sequence of substitutions and the law of iterated expectations allow us











































Note that at this point we assume that economic agents trust in the new system’s
sustainability and know the sequence of countries’ rotation.
Once again, we perform a complex generalized Schur decomposition of D(t) and I (as
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with the usual restriction on ordering generalized eigenvalues. Let us deﬁne an aux-
iliary variable:
˜ xt = ZH
(t)xt (37)
In line with the conventional treatment in the literature, let xt be ordered in such a
way that the ﬁrst partition (x1,t) contains variables predetermined at t. Analogous
partitioning of ˜ xt, substitution of (36) and (18) into (35), premultiplication by Q(t)




























Following Klein (2000), we solve the lower, decoupled row of (19) for ˜ x2,t:
˜ x2,t = T
−1









The ﬁnite cycle of length m, in which the parameters of A(t) and B(t) recur, implies
D(t) = D(t+m) and Rk(t) = Rk(t+m) for each k. We can therefore shift (35) m periods
forward without changing the parameters:
xt+m = D(t)Et+m (xt+2m) + Σ
m−1
k=0 Rk(t)Et+mft+m+k (40)
Matrices Q, Z, S and T, resulting from the Schur decomposition of both matrices of
interest in the above system, will equal those obtained in (36). Then, we can shift
(20) by any multiple of m without changing the parameters:
˜ x2,t+m = T
−1








˜ x2,t+2m = T
−1










As in (34), a sequence of substitutions in (20) and (41) and iterating expectations
allow us to express ˜ x2,t as an inﬁnite sum:
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At this point, we need to know the expected path of future random disturbances,
conditional on the information that agents have at t. Like in Subsection (3.1), we
proceed with an autoregressive error term (23).
With Etεt+k = 0, k = 1,2,..., we can write the inﬁnite sum (42) as
















































































The existence of the inﬁnite sum stems from (i) fulﬁlled assumptions of the Blanchard-
Kahn theorem (exactly all unstable generalized eigenvalues of A and B concentrated
in the partition (2,2) of matrices S and T) as well as (ii) stability of the process (23)
(eigenvalues of Φ lower than 1 in absolute terms). Substitute (43) into (18) after

























We exploit the predeterminacy of x1,t to get:
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In the example considered here, the vector of predetermined variables x1,t contains
lags of all elements in x2,t. Accordingly, some rows in A(t), B(t) and C(t) were trivial
identities deﬁning the equivalence between some elements of x1,t+1 and x2,t. With
the relation between x1,t and x2,t in hand, we can drop these rows and denote the
















































































































3.3 Extension 2: model with heterogenous information sets
We address the second extension considered in this article, i.e. the generalization of
(14) to (15), by using the method of undetermined coeﬃcients proposed by Christiano
(2002). It is applicable when diﬀerent groups of economic agents take their decisions
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with heterogenous knowledge of contemporaneous values of economic shocks. In our
case, there are individual, heterogenous information sets of economic agents in in-
dividual countries of the monetary union. A detailed description of the method in
full generality can be found in Christiano (2002). For the sake of presentational sim-
plicity, this section consumes all the possible simpliﬁcations in the case that we are
investigating.
Christiano (2002) ascribes an individual information set to every equation in the sys-
tem and expectational terms in any equation are conditional upon the content of its
own information set. Every information set contains all the past values of the random
disturbances and part of its contemporaneous values (in an extreme case: all or none















, z1,t - n1-dimensional vector of endogenous variables non-
predetermined at t, z2,t contains q lags of z1,t necessary to determine z1,t+1 at t+1.
In our model, the lag length does not exceed 1, which means q = 0, r = 2 and
zt = z1,t =
h
1 Pt it yt πt
iT
is a vector of length ˜ n ≡ 2 + 3n (n – number of
countries).
However, equation (51) is not equivalent to (2) due to a conceptual diﬀerence in
expectation operators. When information sets for individual equations are heteroge-


















At t, only the union’s central bank is familiar with the entire vec-
tor of current country-speciﬁc demand and supply disturbances, ft = h
εy,1,t ... εy,n,t επ,1,t ... επ,n,t
iT
. The only contemporaneous values of
shocks that economic agents in country j take into account are ones concerning their
own country, i.e. εy,j,t and επ,j,t. Shocks to the other economies enter the information
set of country j agents with a one period lag.
The restrictions excluding some elements of ft from some equations’ information sets
are summarized in the matrix τ sized 2n × ˜ n. Its columns correspond with equa-
tions in the system, rows – with elements of ft; τ[i,j] = 1 when i-th innovation is
included in the information set of equation j and τ[i,j] = 0 otherwise. In our setup,
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τ =
"
0n×2n+1 1n×1 In In
0n×2n+1 1n×1 In In
#
.






exactly due to the exclusion restrictions in τ. Like in Subsection 3.2, we
assume a VAR respresentation (23) for ft. This method, however, additionally requires








with independence of demand and supply disturbances assumed. Christiano (2002)
emphasizes that this input is only required in the presence of at least one non-empty






















Knowing the matrices α0,α1,α2,β0,β1 and τ, Ve, P (see Appendix 2), we can
apply the method of Christiano (2002) to compute the matrices M,N such that the
solution to (51) is of the form
zt = Mzt−1 + Nst (54)
Under complete information sets, the following framework is fully equivalent to the
standard methods (Blanchard-Kahn, Klein, Sims or Uhlig). Moreover, M is always
the same as derived via standard methods, i.e. independent on (in)completeness of
information sets. When at least one of the information sets is incomplete, the key step
in pinning down N is an orthogonal projection from the space of random disturbances
included in an equation’s information set (where ft−1 and part of ft jointly belong) to
the space of all contemporanous and lagged random disturbances (where st belongs).
To obtain M, merge zt and zt−1 and write the system (51) skipping st:
"
α0 0˜ n×˜ n




















Factorize a and b using the generalized Schur decomposition (as in (17)). Arrange
matrices Q,Z,S,T so that the zeros on the main diagonal of S are located in its
lower-right portion. This separates upper-left portions of S and T denoted S11 and
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Let ˜ P denote the rows of P−1 corresponding to the eigenvalues exceeding 1 in abso-














. Matrix M is ﬁnally obtained as
lower ˜ n rows of the matrix −D
−1
1 D2.
To ﬁnd N, deﬁne for every equation i (i.e. for every column τ[:,i] in τ) matrix Ri as
unity matrix in which the rows corresponding to zeros in the vector τ [:,i] were dropped.







































































and ˜ R be deﬁned as R with dropped zero rows resulting from zero ele-






, and let ˜ q be deﬁned as matrix
˜ R
￿
α0 ⊗ PT + (α0A + α1) ⊗ I
￿
in which the columns were dropped whose numbers
corresponded to the rows in ˜ R that we had dropped before. The elements of N are
deﬁned by the relationship vec
￿
NT￿
= −˜ q−1˜ d , whereby the left-hand side vector
- before de-vectorization into NT - needs to be widened and ﬁlled with zeros at the
indices of dropped rows in ˜ R (dropped columns in ˜ q).
4 Simulation results
The models described in Section 2 and solved with the methods from Section 3 has
beed used to simulate the path of the output gap and inﬂation rate of a generic
monetary union’s member countries with diﬀerent assumptions regarding:
1. the home bias of the ECB Governing Council members (α);
2. the information set underlying the formation of expectations of future output
and inﬂation in the countries of a monetary union.
Table 2 contains a set of model parameters used in the simulations. For simplicity, we
assume homogenous parameters of the IS and Phillips curves across countries. Param-
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eter values are median values of statistically signiﬁcant estimates among 12 euro area
countries over the time span 1999-2008, from Torój (2009). The parameters, following
the dominant empirical approach in the New Keynesian literature, were estimated via
generalized method of moments; see Galí and Gertler (1999), Galí, Gertler, López-
Salido (2001), Goodhart and Hofmann (2005) with standard instrument sets for both
curves. The parameters for the Taylor rule and AR processes of the random distur-
bances are parametrized as in the literature overview by Lindé (2005). Every pair of
Table 2: Parameters of the simulated model
ωf 0.55 βr 0.09 γπ 1.5 ρπ 0.1
ωb 0.45 βc 0.04 γy 0.5 ρy 0.5
βf 0.5 βs 0.09 ρ 0.5
βb 0.5 γ 0.05
Source: Torój (2009) Source: Source: Lindé (2005)
variances compared below results from a path of variables generated with the same
path of 10000 random shocks. Demand and supply disturbances were assumed to be
independent. The variances of individual shocks were calibrated in such a way that
the second moments of the baseline paths match those observed in the data on euro
area countries inﬂation and output. The results generally conﬁrm those obtained
Table 3: S.D. of output gap and inﬂation (expressed as a share of S.D. under baseline
scenario)
y π







from a purely backward-looking model by Kosior, Rozkrut, Torój (2009), at least on
the qualitative level. The rotation in the ECB Governing Council, coupled with some
home bias in interest rate decisions among its members, can boost the variance of
inﬂation and output gap. Table 3 presents the results of simulation when a monetary
union consists of 4 equally sized countries and 2 country representatives participate
in every vote. The cycle of rotation lasts 8 quarters, and there is a switch every 2
quarters. The standard deviations of output gap and inﬂation rise as α increases. For
α = 0.5, the standard deviation of the output gap is 0.42% higher than for α = 0 (i.e.
in the model with constant parameters). The standard deviation of inﬂation rises
analogously by 1.64%.
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When the country sizes diﬀer, so do the results for big, mid-size and small economies.
Table 4 presents the results of simulations generated with a 4-country model of mon-
etary union with relative country sizes of 0.4, 0.3, 0.2 and 0.1. Once again, 2 country
representatives vote at a time, the rotation cycle is 8 quarters long and the right of
vote is granted to the governors 7, 5, 3 or 1 time a cycle, in line with their country
size. It is only in the largest economy that the output gap volatility slightly declines
Table 4: S.D. of output gap and inﬂation (expressed as ratio to S.D. under baseline
scenario); diﬀerent country sizes
y π
w = w =
α 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1
0 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
0.1 0.9985 0.9999 1.0012 1.0012 0.9961 1.0001 1.0031 1.0028
0.2 0.9971 0.9999 1.0026 1.0026 0.9927 1.0008 1.0066 1.0062
0.3 0.9958 1.0001 1.0041 1.0041 0.9901 1.0020 1.0107 1.0100
0.4 0.9947 1.0004 1.0058 1.0058 0.9881 1.0038 1.0152 1.0145
0.5 0.9937 1.0008 1.0076 1.0077 0.9867 1.0062 1.0201 1.0195
as α rises. The country of size 0.3 enjoys a slightly positive α for the same reason.
However, starting from approximately α = 0.3, it suﬀers from a rise in output volatil-
ity as the impact of „imported” instability from two small economies and the relative
loss of the central bank’s focus in favour of the greatest country begin to dominate.
In the case of the smallest economies, this eﬀect is visible for any positive home bias
because their relative weight in the union-wide Taylor rule declines with growing α
(it is more eﬃcient to make big neighbours „pro-european” than to remain small and
home-biased) and because they import each other’s volatility simultaneaously. With
α = 0.5, the standard deviation of the output gap is ca. 0.76 − 0.77% higher and
inﬂation – ca. 2% higher than in the baseline scenario.
The impact of excluding the contemporaneous values of foreign demand and supply
shocks from the information set of domestic agents is vague, even on the qualitative
level. Table 5 is composed of standard deviations of output gaps when the informa-
tion sets are incomplete, expressed as shares of standard deviations in the baseline
scenario with complete information. Depending on the correlation of shocks between
countries, serial correlation of country-speciﬁc shocks and – possibly – the country
size, the incompleteness of the information set raises or reduces the volatility of out-
put.
When the serial correlation of demand shocks is low, a home-biased information set
reduces the variance of the output gap. Foreign demand shocks with low persistence
have only limited impact on the domestic economy and start to inﬂuence domestic
expectations once they have partially been absorbed. Note that the serial correlation
of demand shocks at 0 − 0.2 remains far lower than the empirical evidence would
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suggest; see Lindé (2005).
Incomplete information sets also reduce the output volatility when the synchronicity
of shocks between countries is high. In such a monetary union, the country-speciﬁc
information set is suﬃcient to approximate some of the foreign noise and support the
expectations as an auxiliary adjustment channel. When agents believe that shocks are
correlated across countries, they do not fear that an asymmetric shock would induce
inadequacy of the common interest rate and domestic macroeconomic aggregates.
On the other hand, under a high persistence and low symmetry of demand shocks, het-
erogenous and incomplete information sets yield higher variance of the output. Only
with a lag does highly useful information arrive in agent’s expectations. This ham-
pers the „expectations” channel of adjustment and the stabilization of output around
the potential level is more protracted, which generates a higher volatility. Note that
such a stochastic environment is a contradiction of what the optimum currency area
theory views as perfect (synchronized business cycles and at most temporary shocks).
Finally, note the eﬀect in the row of Table 5 corresponding to empirically plausible
values of demand shocks’ serial correlation equal 0.6 and cross-country correlation
equal 0.4. It suggests that in the mid-size economies, a limited information set might
generate higher output volatility, whereas in big and small economies - lower volatility.
Although this result seems to be quantitatively limited, the very fact that this model
was capable to reproduce it might be seen as a weak conﬁrmation of some tentative
evidence reported in earlier literature. Namely, big economies beneﬁt mainly from the
stabilizing eﬀects of common monetary policy and small ones - from the competitive-
ness channel. At the same time, expectation as a supportive channel of stabilization
after asymmetric shocks could be particularly useful in mid-size member countries of
a monetary union. In such countries, economic agents must therefore carefully watch
the external environment. This weak implication of the model certainly needs further
research in more complex DSGE models.
5 Conclusions
This paper generalizes the analytical methods of solving linear rational expectations
models to the case of time-varying, nonstochastic parameters. This speciﬁcation re-
sults from the inclusion of rotational voting system in the ECB when we combine
it with home bias in voters’ preferences. The assumption of a ﬁnite cycle in which
the parameter values recur is thereby exploited. The solution is exempliﬁed with the
case of autoregressive random disturbances. The conditions for existence of a unique
solution correspond in a straightforward way to the standard Blanchard-Kahn condi-
tions.
We also apply the method of Christiano (2002) to introduce heterogeneity in indi-
vidual countries’ information sets. To the best of our knowledge, this algorithm has
not been used before in modelling cross-country adjustment in the euro area. In our
model, agents are home biased in their information sets in such a way that the foreign
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Table 5: Heterogenous information sets – S.D. of output gap (expressed as ratio to








0.4 0.3 0.2 0.07 0.03
0 0 0.78 0.78 0.77 0.76 0.76
0.2 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.90 0.90
0.4 1.13 1.13 1.13 1.14 1.14
0.6 1.50 1.52 1.54 1.58 1.58
0.8 2.22 2.30 2.44 2.52 2.57
0.2 0 0.72 0.72 0.71 0.71 0.71
0.2 0.85 0.85 0.84 0.84 0.84
0.4 1.05 1.05 1.06 1.05 1.05
0.6 1.39 1.42 1.44 1.45 1.45
0.8 2.02 2.11 2.20 2.30 2.32
0.4 0 0.51 0.50 0.49 0.49 0.49
0.2 0.60 0.59 0.59 0.58 0.57
0.4 0.75 0.74 0.74 0.72 0.71
0.6 0.99 0.99 1.01 1.01 0.99
0.8 1.48 1.55 1.55 1.59 1.64
0.6 0 0.23 0.22 0.21 0.20 0.19
0.2 0.28 0.26 0.26 0.24 0.23
0.4 0.34 0.33 0.31 0.31 0.29
0.6 0.47 0.45 0.43 0.42 0.40
0.8 0.70 0.71 0.69 0.69 0.68
0.8 0 0.10 0.09 0.07 0.06 0.06
0.2 0.11 0.10 0.08 0.07 0.06
0.4 0.13 0.12 0.10 0.08 0.08
0.6 0.16 0.14 0.13 0.10 0.10
0.8 0.19 0.18 0.16 0.14 0.13
information arrives in their expectations with a one-period lag. This allows us to
directly apply Christiano’s algorithm.
The simulations based on the former solution method conﬁrm the previous ﬁndings
from the literature: the rotation in the ECB Governing Council, as implemented by
the Treaty of Nice, coupled with home bias in interest rate decisions taken by the
members of the Council, increases the volatility of output and inﬂation in most of
the small and mid-size economies. However, the rise in standard deviation – with the
parametrisation considered here – is very limited and amounts to a maximum of 2%
in small economies.
Forming expectations on the country level with a partial, home-biased information set
may in turn lead to a rise or a decline in the output volatility at home, depending on
(i) the serial correlation of demand disturbances and (ii) their correlation across coun-
tries. When the properties of shocks do not conform to the optimum currency area
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theory, i.e. they are hardly synchronized and highly persistent, the output volatility
can rise as a result of introducing incomplete information sets. This point clearly
needs more investigation in the future.
A number of questions arise for further research, especially done with more sophisti-
cated marcoeconomic models than the illustrative one proposed here. Fristly, it would
be interesting to see how far the heterogeneity of information sets interacts with other
aspects of euro area heterogeneity, such as market rigidities or inﬂation persistence.
Secondly, the solution by Christiano (2002) seems to provide an underlying frame-
work to derive an empirical test for heterogeneity of agent’s information set in the
economy of a real euro area member country. Thirdly, the solution with time-varying
parameters could be applied in euro area DSGE models to verify the impact of the
voting reform and Council members’ home bias, especially in optimum policy models
where the degree of home bias for individual countries would be a decision variable.
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￿
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